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A Mind-Body Problem in the *Zhuangzi*?

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Chapter 18 of the *Zhuangzi*, "Zhi le" 至樂 (Supreme joy), contains some of the most memorable passages articulating a characteristic theme in the compendium.[1] All matter is in constant flux, changing from form to form constantly and inexorably. The chapter ends with a vivid description of the recycling of matter throughout the universe:

> There are originative germs for all species. When they obtain water, they become silky filaments 繢斷.[2] When they are between water and land, they become "frog's-clothing" 蛙蠙之衣 [i.e., moss]. When they grow on elevated ground [by the riverbank], they become plantains 陵舄. When plantains obtain fertile soil, they become "crow's-feet" 烏足 [i.e., another kind of aquatic plant]. The roots of the "crow's-feet" become maggots 蠐螬 and the leaves become butterflies 胡蝶. The butterflies quickly transform into insects that are born beneath stoves; they appear as though having shed their skin, and are called *quduo* 鴝掇. In a thousand days, the *quduo* becomes a bird called *ganyugu* 乾餘骨. The spittle of the *ganyugu* becomes a *simi* 斯彌; the *simi* become "pickle-flies" 食醯. The *yilu* 頤輅 is born of the "pickle-fly"; the *huangkuang* 黃軦 is born of the *jiuyou* 九猷; "grain-grubs"[3] 瞀芮 are born of "rot-worms" 腐蠸. When the "goatherd" 羊奚 is paired with the "no-shoots" 不筍, the "enduring-bamboo" 久竹 produces the *qingning* 青寧. The *qingning* produces leopards 程; leopards produce horses; horses produce people; and people finally return to the originative germs [of nature]. The Myriad Things all emerge from the originative germs and return to the originative germs.[4]

The details in this playful passage are obviously not intended to be precise. One could hardly imagine any ancient writer earnestly believing

that horses give birth to humans.[5] But the larger point is clear and squares well with the rest of the *Zhuangzi*: we are all born of an endless sequence of mysterious transformations, of which our existence as human beings represents only one temporary stage. When we die, our material will be transformed again into some other entity somewhere in the universe.

The chapter expands on this idea to argue against excessive displays of mourning for a loved one. Thus we read that when Zhuangzi's wife died, his boon friend Huizi 惠子 (i.e., Hui Shi 惠施) came to offer his condolences and was shocked to find Zhuangzi banging on a basin and singing.

> Huizi said: "She lived with you, raised your children, and grew old. Now that she is dead, it is enough that you do not weep for her; but banging on a basin and singing—is this not extreme?"
>
> Zhuangzi said: "It is not so. When she first died, how indeed could I not have been melancholy? But I considered that in the beginning, she was without life; not only was she without life, but she was originally without form; not only was she without form, but she was originally without *qi* 氣. In the midst of mixing with cloud and blur, there was a change and there was *qi*; the *qi* changed and there was form; the form changed and there was life; and now there is another change, and there is death. This is the same as the progression of the four seasons, spring, summer, autumn, winter.[6] Moreover, she sleeps now, reclining in a giant chamber; if I were to have accompanied her, weeping and wailing, I would have considered myself ignorant of destiny. So I stopped."[7]

Zhuangzi's point is that mourning is irrational, because his wife's death not only is inevitable but is caused by the same cosmic transformations that originally brought about her very life. To love his wife entails accepting her death as another one of the world's mysterious processes, and our unreflective differentiation between "life" and "death" is shown to be one of those artificial distinctions that the text loves to discredit. Life and death are nothing more than two complementary aspects of the same ineffable cosmic truth.[8]

The *locus classicus* of this view is found in the "Dazongshi" chapter. Four illustrious (and thoroughly fictitious) gentlemen—Zisi 子祀, Ziyu 子輿, Zili 子犁, and Zilai 子來—make a pact:

> "Whoever can take non-action as his head, life as his backbone, death as his buttocks—whoever knows that death, life, existence, and non-existence are one body—we will be friends with him." The four men looked at each other and smiled; none had anything contrary in his mind,[9] so they became friends with each other.

> Soon Ziyu became ill, and Zisi went to visit him. [Ziyu] said: "Great is the Creator of Things—putting me out of shape like this! My back is hunched; my five sense-organs are on top; my chin is hidden in my navel; my shoulders are higher than the crown of my head; my neck-bones point to Heaven." There was a disorder in his *yin* and *yang qi*, but his mind was at ease, as though there was nothing the matter. He limped over to a well and saw his reflection; he said: "Alas! The Creator of Things has put me out of shape like this!"
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> Zisi said: "Do you hate it?"
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> "No, how could I hate it? Suppose my left arm is transformed into a rooster; I would comply and keep track of the time of night.[10] Suppose my right arm is transformed into a crossbow; I would comply and look for an owl to roast. Suppose my buttocks are transformed into wheels and my spirit into a horse; I would comply and ride—why would I ever need a car? Moreover, what we obtain, we obtain because it is the right time; what we lose, we lose because we must follow [the flow of Nature]. If we are at peace with our time and dwell in the flow, sorrow and joy cannot enter into us. This is what the ancients called "unencumbered." Those who are unable to release themselves are tied down by objects. Moreover, things do not last longer than Heaven. So why should I hate it?"[11]

The intended point of this passage is the same as that of Zhuangzi's lecture to Huizi: death is merely another cosmic transformation that we must accept with equanimity. Ziyu's brilliant speech, however, raises certain problems that one suspects the author has not entirely thought through. The first indication comes in the statement that "there was disorder in his *yin* and *yang qi*, but his mind was at ease, as though there was nothing the matter" 陰陽之氣有沴，其心有閒而無事. In other words, although something very unusual has happened to his material substance—his *yin* and *yang qi*—this irregularity has not affected his mental processes. But then what material is his mind made of? It seems as though the author presupposes a disembodied mental power within Ziyu that can continue to function despite massive corporeal decay. This is a significant point, because it appears that we have encountered a mind-body problem—the arch-vexation of Western philosophy. (In what follows, I will use the term *mind-body problem* to refer specifically to the suggestion that the mind and the body may be metaphysically distinct entities. There are, of course, other possible interpretations of the phrase.)

The mystery only deepens when Ziyu avers cheerfully that if his buttocks were to be made into wheels, and his spirit into a horse 以神為馬, he would simply comply with his destiny and ride around, with no further need of a carriage. Whatever this "spirit" refers to, it cannot be a designation for the mental faculty that remains unperturbed in the face of terrifying transformations of matter—because even after his spirit is transformed into a horse, he still retains the power to assess his situation calmly and make the best of it.[12] It is hard to escape the conclusion that he conceives of his "mind" as an entity with no physical material at all.

Ziyu's speech raises several further questions. First, how does the *Zhuangzi* account for intelligence within its theory of cosmically recycling matter? For modern readers, part of the allure of that view, with its "crow's-feet" and "pickle-flies," must be that it is so strikingly similar to our own. To be sure, we do not believe that maggots and butterflies are born of the roots and leaves of a plant, but how different is the idea, in its essentials, from what we read in *Hamlet*?

> *Hamlet:* Your worm is your only emperor for diet: we fat all creatures else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for maggots; your fat king and your lean beggar is but variable service, two dishes, but to one table—that's the end.
>
> *King:* Alas, alas!
>
> *Hamlet:* A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat of a fish that hath fed of that worm.[13]

And of course, the *Zhuangzi* contains another famous scene with an identical point:

> Zhuangzi was about to die, and his disciples wished to bury him richly. Zhuangzi said: "I take Heaven and Earth as my coffin and sarcophagus, the sun and moon as my linked jade disks, the stars and constellations as my pearls, and the Myriad Things as my mortuary gifts. Will the accoutrements of my burial not be sufficient? Why add all this?"
>
> The disciples said: "We are afraid that the crows and kites may eat you, Master."
>
> Zhuangzi said: "Above, it will be the crows and kites that eat me; below, it will be the crickets and ants that eat me. Why be partial?"[14]

Zhuangzi, Hamlet, and we ourselves—with our concepts of the "food-chain" and the "law of the conservation of matter"—observe rightly enough that we are made of the same material as the animals and vegetables that we eat and the worms and maggots that eat us after death. But *none* of these schemes explains very clearly why—if the same basic stuff can appear equally in fish, worms, and human beings—neither fish nor worms, nor "crow's-feet" nor "pickle-flies," possess intelligence or consciousness! Where in the great process of material transformation

do inanimate objects like "silky filaments" obtain the capacity to reflect on their condition, to utter oaths and speeches, to philosophize with an unmoved mind? This is as serious a problem for Zhuangzi's view of the world as it is for our own.

One possible solution, for Zhuangzi's case, may be that *all* material, in all its forms, possesses these complex mental faculties—that is to say, mental processes are simply an attribute of material. After all, the text is filled with such images as philosophical butterflies,[15] laughing cicadas, and talking metal. The *Zhuangzi* may imagine the world to be inhabited by untold billions of minds, residing in moss, residing in rot-worms. In this case, the consciousness of human beings would not present a particular problem.

However, there are reasons why it is doubtful that this is how the *Zhuangzi* conceives of the world. First, the fact that self-conscious butterflies may appear in dreams does not mean that self-conscious butterflies must exist in nature. It is reasonable to interpret the references to dreaming butterflies and talking cicadas as illustrative examples that the author or authors use, *when it suits them*, to convey the larger philosophical points. Otherwise, when the figure of Zhuangzi bangs on his basin, we should expect the basin to squawk back. Such events do not occur often enough in the text for us to believe that the authors really conceive of animate basins.

Second, and more important, the text regularly describes the "mind" in contexts where it can only be construed as entirely disembodied. Consider the following anecdote from "Zhi le:"

> Zhuangzi went to Chu and saw a hollow skull; it was brittle, but retained its shape. He tapped it with his riding-crop, and then he asked it: "Sir, was it because of your greed for life and loss of principles that you ended up like this? Or was it because you were involved in the affairs of a doomed state, and were executed with an axe, that you ended up like this? Or was it because you were involved in evil conduct, bringing shame on the reputation of your father, mother, wife, and children, that you ended up like this? Or was it because you had the misfortune to freeze or starve that you ended up like this? Or maybe your years just came to an end?" When he was done talking, he picked up the skull, and used it as a pillow to sleep.
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> At midnight, the skull appeared in a dream, saying: "You speak like a sophist! I perceive that your words are all born of the encumbrances of humanity. In death there is none of this. Would you like to hear an explanation of death?"
>
> Zhuangzi said: "Yes."
>
> The skull said: "In death, there is no ruler above, no subject below. There is also no such thing as the four seasons; one simply follows Heaven and Earth as one's spring and autumn. Even the joys of a south-facing king cannot exceed this."
>
> Zhuangzi did not believe him, and said: "If I commanded the Director of Destiny 司命 to restore your body to life;[16] to make bones, flesh, meat, and skin for you; to return your father, mother, wife, children, and village acquaintances; would you wish it?"
>
> The skull frowned in deep vexation, and said: "How could I abandon the joys of a south-facing king and return to the toils of life among men?"[17]

The "person" pertaining to this skull will evidently enjoy the rest of eternity in a kind of timeless Never-never-land. Zhuangzi's interlocutor looks suspiciously like an immaterial soul. Similarly, we remember that when his wife dies, Zhuangzi remarks that she now "sleeps, reclining in a giant chamber." But according to the earlier theory of the transformation of matter, all of one's material should be reconstituted into some other physical object at the moment of death. This is, after all, Zili's point when he consoles his friend Zilai, who is lying deathly ill: "Great is the Creator and Transformer! What will you be made into next? Where will you be sent? Will you be made into a rat's liver? Will you be made into an insect's leg?"[18] Rat's livers and insect's legs manifestly do not live in the carefree death-world of Zhuangzi's wife and the hollow skull from Chu. What, then, do we have to look forward to after death: coming back as a rat's liver or spending eternity in supreme and somnolent bliss?

I think the only way to reconcile this problem is to assume that our *material* will be recycled into something phenomenal like a rat's liver, but that our *disembodied minds* live on in some mysteriously timeless and immaterial place. This is not only an identity problem—are "we" the substance that will be transformed into a rat's liver or the ghost that will survive forever?—it is also a mind-body problem.

Moreover, this conundrum is not unique to the *Zhuangzi*. One of the most remarkable examples of an unacknowledged mind-body problem appears in the writings of Xunzi 荀子 (third cent. B.C.). The relevant passage appears in a philosophical discussion of abdication: "They say: 'When [the king] is old and decrepit, he should abdicate.' This is also not so. In his blood, *qi*, sinews, and energy, there may be decay; but in his wisdom, deliberations, choices, and rejections, there is no decay."[19] In Xunzi's system, the *qi* and the mind appear to flourish and decay independently of each other. He does not address the evident difficulty: what material,

then, is the mind made of? I believe Xunzi means to say that the mind and the body are metaphysically distinct substances. In particular, his calculated use of the term *qi* emphasizes his view that the mind cannot be composed of the same material as the rest of the body.[20]

The suggestion that there is an unacknowledged mind-body problem (or call it a "folk-psychological" dualism)[21] in certain ancient Chinese philosophical texts is likely to prove controversial. In a sense, this is curious, because if one were to make the same claim about ancient Greek philosophy—or about Augustine, or any number of pre-Cartesian thinkers—one might not expect much objection. In the study of traditional Chinese philosophy however, the very suggestion of a mind-body dichotomy has attained the status of a taboo. This is because the most authoritative textbooks, insofar as they discuss the issue at all, agree that no such problem ever haunted Chinese philosophy and that reading it into the Chinese context represents an unwarranted imposition of Western concerns. To quote A. C. Graham, who is perhaps the single most influential critic:

> [The mind-body dichotomy] never emerged in pre-Han philosophy; the word *xin* 心 "heart" is sometimes translated as "mind," reasonably enough in later philosophy influenced by Indian Buddhism, but in the classical period it refers only to the heart as the organ with which one thinks, approves and disapproves. (Thinking is not in traditional China located in the brain.) . . . Confucius is not a victim of the post-Cartesian superstition of mind as "ghost in the machine"; he does not conceive the difference between ritual as dignified and reverent performance and as empty formality in terms of the presence or absence of dignity and formality in the performer's mind.[22]

These strictures can be traced back directly to Herbert Fingarette, an insightful Western philosopher who, late in life, attempted to explain the philosophy of the Confucian *Analects* 論語 (and who, it should be remarked, was not trained as a scholar of Chinese). According to Fingarette, when Confucius refers to the virtue of *ren* 仁 (humanity), he does not imply anything like an inner mental condition; he means nothing more than submitting to *li* 禮 (ritual). Fingarette emphasized this point to show that Confucius did not partake of a conception of human nature that was "psychologized" along the lines so familiar from Western philosophy and that most previous interpreters made the mistake of simply assuming that he did.

> Thus *li* and *ren* are two aspects of the same thing . . . *Li* refers to the act as overt and distinguishable pattern of sequential behavior; *ren* refers to the act as the single, indivisible gesture of an actor, as his, and as particular and individual by reference to the unique individual who performs the act and to the unique context of the particular action.
>
> Our more familiar Western terminology would be misleading. We are tempted to go further than I have above and say *ren* refers to the attitudes, feelings, wishes and will. This terminology is misleading. The thing we must *not* do is to psychologize Confucius's terminology in the *Analects*. The first step in seeing that this is so is to recognize that *ren* and its associated "virtues," and *li* too, are not connected in the original text with the language of "will," "emotion," and "inner states." The move from *ren* as referring us to a person on to *ren* as "therefore" referring us to his inner mental or psychic condition or processes finds no parallel in the *Analects*. Certainly there is no systematic or even unsystematic elaboration of any such connections.[23]

Insofar as I understand his argument, Fingarette seems to be saying that Confucius neither accepts nor rejects an image of the mind as the locus of inner mental states: the whole idea of such an alternative never even occurs to him. As a virtue, *ren* does not presuppose any mental states whatsoever; it is merely another term for the skillful practice of *li*. Moreover, when Confucius appears to discuss various "emotions," these are really nothing more than observable conditions. For example, when it says in *Analects* 2.6 that parents are "worried" (*you* 憂) about their child's illness, this is to be understood as a "response to trouble" and should not be "conceived as rooted in troubled 'inner' states."[24]

Fingarette constructed this argument in 1972, at a time when many Western philosophers were, for their own reasons, particularly irritated by traditional Western mentalism. One can only imagine how refreshing it must have been to discover that Confucius was innocent of "Cartesian superstitions." But Fingarette's account of *ren* is controversial[25] and was originally intended, in any case, to apply only to the *Analects*—which are sufficiently vague as to allow for a number of mutually incompatible interpretations, some of them "psychologized," some of them not. In any case, whether or not Fingarette's contention is tenable in the context of the *Analects*, I think Graham and others have erred in extending Fingarette's contention to cover *all* of traditional Chinese thought.

To be sure, it is certain that no Chinese philosopher ever problematized the notion of inner mental states in any manner remotely like that of Descartes. It is also plain that many Chinese philosophers conceived of the heart-mind as just another organ of the body and not an immaterial ghost or spirit. And then there were those schemes that did not conceive

of a mind (in any philosophical sense) whatsoever. The *Huainanzi* 淮南子, for example, expounds a thoroughgoing materialism (inherited, no doubt, from the *Zhuangzi*) in which human beings, like all other physical objects, are thought to be made up of *qi*. Since *qi* obeys certain constant and knowable physical laws, a skillful ruler can make his subjects do anything he wants them to, merely by stimulating their *qi* in the appropriate manner. The idea is especially well illustrated in the phenomenon of sympathetic musical vibrations.

> The lord—oh how he is like an archer! A minute [error] here counts for feet and yards there [by the target]. Therefore [the lord] is cautious about how he stimulates [the people]. When Rong Qiqi 榮啓期 plucked [his instrument] once, Confucius was joyous for three days; he was stimulated by harmony. When Zou Ji 鄒忌 (385–319 B.C.)[26] strummed once wildly, King Wei (of Qi 齊威王, r. 357–320 B.C.) was sorrowful all night; he was stimulated by melancholy.[27] If one moves them with the lute and zither, and forms them with tones and sounds, one can make the people grieve or be joyous.[28]

In this chillingly regulated world, the sovereign simply strikes the appropriate chord, and his subjects assume perforce the intended attitude. These claims are all presented without any consideration of the people's ability or even *will* to resist this form of control. The text grants only that the people may be disaffected and cause trouble if they are mistreated. What the *Huainanzi* refuses to accept is the notion that people may have any kind of spiritual life, that they may have likes and dislikes that are not motivated solely by their five senses, and that they have the capability and obligation of moral development.[29]

It was even possible for Mencius, a Chinese philosopher with a very sophisticated concept of 'mind,' to avoid entirely the problem of dualism by conceiving of the heart (the locus of the mind) as a part of the body with a specific function, like all others.

> Gongduzi 公都子 asked: "Though we are equally human, why is it that some become greater people, and others become lesser people?"
>
> Mencius said: "Those who follow their greater parts become greater people; those who follow their lesser parts become lesser people."
>
> "Though we are equally human, why is it that some follow their greater parts, and others follow their lesser parts?"
>
> "The ears and eyes, as organs, do not think, and they become clouded by objects. When an object engages [the sense organ], it simply leads it away. The heart, as an organ, thinks. If it thinks, then it obtains [what it seeks]; if it does not think, then it does not obtain it. This is what Heaven has imparted to me. If one takes one's stand first on [the part] that is greater, then the parts that are lesser cannot snatch it away. This is simply the way to become a greater person."[30]

With this elegant formulation, Mencius is able to fulfill two competing philosophical obligations. On the one hand, he remains true to his conviction that the difference between humans and animals—and between moral and immoral people—lies in the mind. On the other hand, he avoids the problem of an immaterial spirit or a "ghost in the machine" by asserting that the mind is simply a part of the body: it is the organ of the body that "thinks" 思 (in Mencius's special moral sense), just as the eyes and ears are the organs that perceive objects. In other words, while Mencius may or may not believe in the possibility of inner mental states, it is clear that he does not see any need to separate the mind and the body on a metaphysical level.

However, while these passages from *Huainanzi* and Mencius appear to bear out Graham's claims, the examples of Xunzi and Zhuangzi demonstrate that we need not retain the familiar assessment, "pre-Han philosophy knows nothing of a mind-body dichotomy."[31] Indeed, Xunzi's sophisticated conception of the mind as spectator and director is so "mentalist" that it is hardly surprising he should find it impossible in the passage discussed above to locate even the most basic mental faculties in the normal substance of the body.[32] His notion of "knowing the Way" is distinctive and comes close to the Western idea of cognizing truths of nature within an inner mental theater.

> One might sit in a room and still see the Four Seas; one might reside in the present and still expound on bygone and distant times. If one is conversant with the Myriad Things and knows their essence, if one tests order and disorder and is conversant with their systems, then one can treat Heaven and Earth as one's warp and woof and assign the proper roles to the Myriad Things.[33]

When a philosopher declares that one might sit inside one's chamber and still "see" everything within the Four Seas, there cannot be much doubt that he conceives of a mind with an actively theatrical imagination, with entire worlds and fantasies parading before a disembodied mental "viewer." This is not a mind that is unfamiliar with what Fingarette calls "inner mental states."[34]

But it is never clear in Xunzi precisely how these mental processes function. How is it possible that the outside world can be viewed from

within the confines of one's room? Where does the "viewing" take place? He simply did not ask the necessary questions that show he was aware of a mind-body problem. On the basis of his statement about the aged king with his unimpeded mind, one must presume that Xunzi simply takes it as a matter of course that the mental world is a world of its own, fundamentally separate from the physical world. This is to say that Xunzi subscribed intuitively to "folk psychology" (as the term is currently used). I believe the *Zhuangzi* did so as well, and I suspect that the same general view can be found in still other ancient Chinese texts.[35]

These issues are brought into clear focus in the following anecdote from the *Mozi* 墨子:

> In the past, in the time of Bao 鮑, Lord Wen of Song 宋文君 (r. 610–589 B.C.), there was a functionary named Priest Guangu 觀辜 who was following the service for a ghost.[36] The medium[37] emerged with a staff; he said to him: "Guangu, why are the jade tablets and disks not up to their full measure? Why is the wine and millet unclean? Why are the sacrificial victims not unblemished and fat? Why are the offerings of spring, summer, autumn, and winter[38] not timely? Did you do this, or did Bao do this?"
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> Guangu said: "Bao is young and immature; he is still in his diapers. What could Bao know about this? This was done specifically by the functionary in charge, Guangu."
>
> The medium lifted his staff and beat him, killing him on top of the altar. At the time, those people in Song who were participating in the ceremony all saw it; those who were far away all heard it. It is written in the annals of Song. The feudal lords transmitted [the story] and commented: "For whoever is not reverent and cautious about sacrifices, the punishment of the spirits is even as swift as this." Seeing that the story is in several books, one can hardly doubt that ghosts exist.[39]

Here we have, in the starkest possible terms, a ghost in a machine. The function of the "medium" 祩子 in this ceremony is to serve as a physical receptacle for the spirit being cultivated. This particular spirit was evidently dissatisfied with the lassitude of the "functionary in charge" 官臣 and punished him by using the body of the medium to kill him. As far as the viewers were concerned, the medium himself played no part in the gruesome affair; his own mental processes were somehow temporarily shut off. It was obvious to everyone present that the offended spirit exercised its will and bludgeoned Guangu to death. Just how this could all happen is never explained, because the operative worldview, again, is unproblematized. After all, it is only a philosophical materialist who could ask how spirits or souls might animate bodies and effect their intentions

through them. The author of this particular text apparently had no difficulty in conceiving of a dualistic universe populated by material bodies and immaterial spirits.[40] And this particular story is by no means unusual; the ancient literature abounds with similar tales of ghosts and spirits, some beneficent, some malevolent, some thoroughly inscrutable.[41]

The tale of Guangu and the ghost transcending matter reveals a dualistic conception of the world that is a necessary condition for the notion of a metaphysical mind-body dichotomy. The world of the ghost who killed Guangu is the same as the world where Zhuangzi believes his wife sleeps peacefully and where the skull from Chu enjoys its timeless bliss, free from the cares of human existence. It is the world of the spirit. So the orientation of the *Zhuangzi* is at once materialistic and dualistic. We are told, on the one hand, that all matter constantly cycles and recycles through various shapes and combinations and, on the other hand, that our immaterial spirit escapes this process and lives on *in essentially the same form* after death. All in all, this conception is not so surprising: we know of a similar idea from Western religious philosophy, namely the doctrine of the "immaterial soul."[42] We ourselves commonly express a compatible worldview, when, after the death of a loved one, we console ourselves by saying that he or she is still present with us, still "looking down at us" from Heaven. Even people who do not take such statements seriously have heard them before and should have no trouble understanding them.

Appendix: The Dream Problem in the *Zhuangzi*

There is one other important respect in which the *Zhuangzi* broaches philosophical problems associated with the mind-body dichotomy. The text is notable for its recurring dream sequences, in which the apparent reality of reality is questioned by comparing it to the apparent reality of a dream. Yet as famous as these passages are, their philosophical significance is still frequently overlooked.[43] The butterfly dream is probably the most oft-cited example of this theme in the *Zhuangzi*:

> Once Zhuang Zhou dreamt that he was a butterfly, a butterfly fluttering happily, and he was aware that this is what he wanted to be. He did not know that he was Zhou. Soon he awoke, and, startled, he was Zhou. He did not know whether he was Zhou dreaming that he was a butterfly, or whether he was a butterfly dreaming that he was Zhou.[44]

And similarly:

> Who dreams of wine weeps in the morning; who dreams of weeping hunts in the morning. While one is dreaming, one does not know that it is a dream, and in the middle of the dream one may even divine one's dream. Only after waking does one know that it was a dream. Soon there will be a Great Awakening, after which we will know that this is a Great Dream. And fools think themselves "awake," confident that they know things: this is a lord, this a shepherd. How obtuse! Confucius and you are all dreaming. When I say that you are dreaming, I am also dreaming.[45]

The point of these passages is that it is not so self-evidently true that we are what we think we are. Perhaps our existence and experiences are nothing more than the dreams of a butterfly—for how can we tell the difference between our perceptions of reality and the unreal experiences of dreams?[46] The issue here is the same as what Gareth B. Matthews[47] has called the "epistemological dream problem" in Descartes:

> How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events—that I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire—when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.[48]

Strictly speaking, the "dream problem" ("How do I know whether I am now dreaming?") is not the same as the mind-body problem, but the two are related in that they both hinge on the reflexive use of the first-person pronoun, *I*.[49] That is to say, when I ask, "How do I know whether I am dreaming?" I do not mean, "How do I know whether Paul Rakita Goldin is dreaming?"—for I can still ask the dream question without any external knowledge of who I am. I mean: "How do I know, from my own point of view, whether I am dreaming?" This special, "reflexive" use of '*I*' has been distinguished from regular uses of *I* ("I am hungry," etc.) by means of the conventional marker '*I**'."[50] Remarkably, it has been suggested that the *Zhuangzi* makes effectively the same distinction through its complementary usage of the first-person pronouns *wo* 我 (I) and *wu* 吾 (I*).[51] In any case, what is clear is that the *Zhuangzi* uses the "epistemological dream problem" to ask the type of skeptical question that Richard Rorty identifies as the watershed in the history of Western philosophy: "How do we know that anything which is mental represents anything which is not mental?"[52]

Unlike Descartes, however, the Zhuangzi makes no explicit attempt to solve the dream problem.[53] This difference should come as no great surprise, since it is well established that the Zhuangzi prefers to ask epistemological questions rather than to answer them. (This is the sense in which the skepticism of the Zhuangzi has been called "therapeutic.")[54] But the fact that Zhuangzi does not solve the dream problem ought not prevent us from recognizing that he raises it, and in this respect, comes closer to the Cartesian mode of skepticism than any other Chinese philosopher.

Notes

I would like to thank Bryan W. Van Norden for helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

1. Most commentators agree that "Zhi le" is a later chapter with close philosophical links to the so-called *neipian* 內篇 (Inner Chapters), especially chapter 6, "Dazongshi" 大宗師 (The great ancestral teacher). It is justifiable, therefore, to use the famous images in "Zhi le" as illustrative examples of a Zhuangzian theme, even though it is extremely unlikely that the chapter was written by Zhuang Zhou 莊周 himself. See, e.g., Liu Xiaogan, *Classifying the* Zhuangzi *Chapters*, Michigan Monographs in Chinese Studies 65 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1994), p. 100; Zhang Hengshou 張恒壽, *Zhuangzi xintan* 莊子新探 (Wuhan: Hubei renmin, 1983), p. 198; A. C. Graham, "How Much of *Chuang-tzu* Did Chuang-tzu Write?" *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 47.3 (1979), reprinted in Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 283; Hu Yüan-chün 胡遠濬, *Zhuangzi quangu* 莊子詮詁 (Taipei: Shangwu, 1967), p. 141; Guan Feng 關鋒, "*Zhuangzi* waizapian chutan" 莊子外雜篇初探, in Zhexue yanjiu bianji bu 哲學研究編輯部, *Zhuangzi zhexue taolun ji* 莊子哲學討論集 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1962), pp. 61–98; Lin Yunming 林雲銘 (fl. 1663), *Zhuangzi yin* 莊子因, in *Wuqiubei zhai Zhuangzi jicheng chubian* 無求備齋莊子集成初編, ed. Yen Ling-feng 嚴靈峰 (Taipei: Yiwen, 1972), 18, 4, p. 26b; and Chen Zhi'an 陳治安 (fl. 1632), *Nanhua zhenjing benyi* 南華真經本義, in *Wuqiubei zhai Zhuangzi jicheng xubian* 續編, ed. Yen Ling-feng 嚴靈峰, (Taipei: Yiwen, 1974), 26, 11, p. 1a. On the other hand, Jiang Fucong 蔣復璁, "*Zhuangzi* kaobian" 莊子考辨, *Tushuguan xue jikan* 圖書館學季刊 2.1, reprinted in

Xu Weishu tongkao 續偽書通考, ed. Cheng Liang-shu 鄭良樹 (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1984), 2, p. 1382, considers the chapter "overdone" 矯枉過直 and "the fabrication of a shallow scholar" 淺學者之所為.

2. Following the commentary in Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩 (1844–1896), *Zhuangzi jishi* 莊子集釋, ed. Wang Xiaoyu 王孝魚, Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961), p. 625, note 2. Most commentators read *jue* 絕 here, but Guo Qingfan's "father" 家世父 (Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾) explains the merits of the reading *xuduan* 續斷, which are silky filaments found in water. See also the commentary in Wang Shu-min 王叔岷, *Zhuangzi jiaoquan* 莊子校詮, 2nd edition, Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiusuo zhuankan 88 (Taipei, 1994), 2, p. 659, note 6.

3. I assume that the *maorui* 瞀芮 is the same creature known in Modern Mandarin as the *maozei* 蟊賊.

4. ZZJS 624–25; HY 47–48/18/46. All translations in this chapter are my own unless otherwise indicated. Cf. the translations in Victor H. Mair, *Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu* (New York: Bantam, 1994; rpt., Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), pp. 172 f.; and Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 204.

5. Nevertheless, we must not overestimate the ancients' knowledge of nature and ecology. As late as the eleventh century, for example, Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) suggested in all seriousness that fireflies are born of decaying grass and that lice are born spontaneously in new clothes. See Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), *Henan Chengshi yishu* 河南程氏遺書 (*Guoxue jiben congshu* 國學基本叢書), 18, p. 220. Cf. also A. C. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers: The Metaphysics of the Brothers Ch'eng*, 2nd edition (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1992), p. 36.

6. There is an anacoluthia in the original: "spring, autumn, winter, summer" 春秋冬夏.

7. "Zhile," ZZJS 614–15; HY 46/18/15–19. Compare the translations in Mair, *Wandering on the Way*, pp. 168 f., and Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 209.

8. This interpretation is by no means novel; see e.g., Chen Guying 陳鼓應, *Zhuangzi qianshuo* 莊子淺說 (Hong Kong: Shang-wu, 1991), pp. 27 ff.; A. C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), pp. 202–04; and Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, tr. Derk Bodde, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 1, pp. 236–39. Cf. also, e.g., "Zhi beiyou" 知北遊, ZZJS 733; HY 58/22/11–12: "The birth of a human being is the accumulation of *qi*. When it accumulates, there is life; when it dissipates, there is death. Since death and life are in league with each other, what should I be vexed about?"

9. That is, they did not harbor any notions that were "contrary" 逆 to the "mysterious principles" 玄理 of the Way, as Cheng Xuanying 成玄英 (fl. 630–60) explains in his commentary. The idea here is that the four gentlemen have overcome the blinkered human tendency to formulate one's own private opinions—one's own "completed mind" (*chengxin* 成心), in the language of the *Zhuangzi*. For more on this idea in the *Zhuangzi*, see e.g., Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, pp. 191 ff., and Harold H. Oshima, "A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the *Chuang-tzu*," in *Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu*, ed. Victor H. Mair, Asian Studies at Hawaii 29 ([Honolulu]: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 63–84. Cf. also Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692), *Zhuangzi jie* 莊子解 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961), p. 16.

10. I believe the character *qiu* 求 in *yu yin yi qiu shi ye* 予因以求時夜 is excrescent, by confusion with *qiu* in the next clause. The commentary of Lu Deming 陸德明 (556–627) notes that one edition omits *qiu*. See also the commentary of Yu Yue 俞樾 (1821–1907), *Zhuangzi jiaoquan*, 1, p. 245, note 10.

11. "Dazongshi," ZZJS 258–60; HY 17/6/45–53. Cf. the translations in Mair, *Wandering on the Way*, pp. 57 f., and Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 196 f.

12. According to the conventional worldview of the Six Dynasties, this "spirit" 神 was conceived unproblematically as another kind of *qi* that is subject to the same transformations as all other kinds of matter. In other words, it was not understood as an immaterial spirit. See especially the view attributed to the interlocutor of Huiyuan 慧遠 (A.D. 334–416) in "Shamen bujing wang zhe lun" 沙門不敬王者論, which is preserved in Seng You 僧祐 (445–518), *Hongming ji* 弘明集 (Taipei: Zhonghua, 1983), 5, p. 9a. Cf. also Charles Holcombe, *In the Shadow of the Han: Literati Thought and Society at the Beginning of the Southern Dynasties* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 100 f. For an overview of the concept of '*shen*' in early traditions of meditation, see Harold D. Roth, "The Early Taoist Concept of *Shen*: A Ghost in the Machine?" in *Sagehood and Systematizing Thought in Warring States and Han China*, ed. Kidder Smith Jr. (Brunswick, Maine: Asian Studies Program, Bowdoin College, 1990), pp. 11–32. However, this later conception of the "spirit" is firmly in line with the general materialist tendency of the Six Dynasties and therefore may not reflect the original viewpoint of the *Zhuangzi*.

13. *Hamlet* IV.iii,21–28; text in G. Blakemore Evans, ed., *The Riverside Shakespeare* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 1171.

14. "Lie Yukou" 列禦寇, ZZJS 1063; HY 90/32/47–50. Compare the translation in Mair, *Wandering on the Way*, p. 332.

15. See the appendix to this chapter.

16. On the idea of resurrection in the Warring States and the power of the divinity known as the "Director of Destiny" 司命, see e.g., Mu-chou Poo, *In Search of Personal Welfare: A View of Ancient Chinese Religion* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 66. A recently excavated text from

Fangmatan 放馬灘, Gansu Province, tells a gripping story of resurrection; see Donald Harper, "Resurrection in Warring States Popular Religion," *Taoist Resources* 5:2 (1994), pp. 13–28; Li Xueqin 李學勤, "Fangmatan jian zhong de zhiguai gushi" 放馬灘簡中的志怪故事, *Wenwu* 文物 1990.4, pp. 43–47; and He Shuangquan 何雙全, "Tianshui Fangmatan Qinjian jiazhong rishu kaoshu" 天水放馬灘秦簡甲種日書考述, in *Qin-Han jiandu lunwen ji* 秦漢簡牘論文集, ed. Gansu Sheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo ([Lanzhou]: Gansu renmin, 1989), pp. 7–28.

17. "Zhi le," ZZJS 617–19; HY 46–47/18/22–29. Compare the translation in Mair, *Wandering on the Way*, p. 170.

18. "Dazongshi," ZZJS 261; HY 17/6/55–56.

19. "Zhenglun" 正論; text in Wang Xianqian 王先謙 (1842–1918), *Xunzi jijie* 荀子集解, ed. Shen Xiaohuan 沈嘯寰 and Wang Xingxian 王星賢, Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1988), 12.18, p. 333. Cf. the translation in John Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988–94), 3, p. 41.

20. I have drawn attention to this passage in Paul Rakita Goldin, "Insidious Syncretism in the Political Philosophy of *Huai-nan-tzu*," *Asian Philosophy* 9:2 (1999). Mark Edward Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 224, and Sawada Takio 澤田多喜男, "*Junshi* 荀子 to Ryoshi Shunjū 呂氏春秋 ni okeru ki," in *Ki* 氣 *no shisō* 思想—*Chūgoku* 中國 *ni okeru shizenkan* 自然觀 *to ningenkan* 人間觀 *no tenkai* 展開, ed. Onozawa Seiichi 小野澤精一, et al. (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku, 1978), pp. 85 f., both discuss this passage, but without considering its relevance to the mind-body problem.

For another early example, consider the following lines from the *Chuci* 楚辭: "When people are born, they all have something in which they take their pleasure; I have taken it as my rule only to be fond of elegance. Though my body be dismembered, I would still not change; for how could my mind reform through punishment?" In Jin Kaicheng 金開誠, et al., *Qu Yuan ji jiaozhu* 屈原集校注, Zhongguo gudian wenxue jiben congshu (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1996), 1, p. 48. The author is evidently denying that his mind can be affected by stimuli applied to his body. Nevertheless, the metaphysical underpinnings of this passage are far less clear, and it may not be necessary to presuppose an immaterial mind in this case.

21. For a seminal but controversial view of "folk psychology," see Paul M. Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," *Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981), pp. 67–90; and Churchland, *Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). It is not often observed that the term *folk psychology* (which is evidently intended to be disparaging) is infelicitous and extremely misleading. First, the presence of the word *folk* (on analogy with *folk music*, *folk wisdom*, etc.) implies that different "folks" may have different "folk psychologies." But it has been suggested by certain "innatists" that something akin to the "folk-psychological" paradigm is actually wired into the human brain. See, e.g., Jerry A. Fodor, *The Language of Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). Moreover, one fundamental premise of "eliminative materialism" is that "folk psychology" represents a coherent and homogeneous theory. This supposition is not uncontested—in part because of observed differences in the content of "folk psychology" among various cultures. See, e.g., Roy G. D'Andrade, "A Folk Model of the Mind," in *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*, ed. Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

22. *Disputers of the Tao*, pp. 25 f., with the Romanization converted. Cf. also Chad Hansen, *A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Perspective* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 75 ff.; and Hansen, "Language in the Heart-mind," in *Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots*, ed. Robert E. Allinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 84 ff. Similarly, Chris Jochim, "Just Say No to 'No Self' in *Zhuangzi*," in *Wandering at Ease in the* Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 50 ff., denies that there is any place for a "mind-body dualism" in the *Zhuangzi*'s concept of '*xin*.'

23. Herbert Fingarette, *Confucius—The Secular as Sacred*, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 42f., with Romanization emended; emphasis in original. Fingarette is surely influenced here by Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), esp. pp. 11 ff.

24. Fingarette, *Confucius*, pp. 44 f. Incidentally, the implicit interpretation of *Analects* 2.6 here is debatable; many commentators take this passage to refer to the *parents'* illness, and not that of the child. See Cheng Shude 程樹德 (1877–1944), *Lunyu jishi* 論語集釋, ed. Cheng Junying 程俊英 and Jiang Jianyuan 蔣見元, Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990), 3, pp. 83 ff.

25. For some responses to Fingarette's thesis, see, in addition to the works mentioned in note 22, above, Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1985), pp. 71 ff.; Herrlee G. Creel, "Discussion of Professor Fingarette on Confucius," in *Studies in Classical Chinese Thought*, ed. Henry Rosemont Jr., and Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Thematic Issue 47:3 (1979), pp. 407–16; the review article by Henry Rosemont Jr. in *Philosophy East and West* 26:4 (1976), pp. 463–77; as well as Fingarette's response and Rosemont's counter-response, *Philosophy East and West* 28:4 (1978), pp. 511–19.

My own view is that Fingarette underestimates the importance of such passages as the "triple self-examination" in *Analects* 1.4, *Lunyu jishi* 1, p. 18: "Zengzi 曾子 said: 'Everyday I examine myself on three counts. In planning for others, have I failed to be sincere? In my intercourse with friends, have I

failed to be trustworthy? Do I fail to practice what I teach?'" Zengzi's notion of "self-examination" implies certain cognitive faculties, and the idea makes very little sense unless we imagine something akin to a Cartesian theater, wherein Zengzi's mind observes dispassionately the conduct of the self.

26. See Ch'ien Mu 錢穆, *Xian-Qin zhuzi xinian* 先秦諸子繫年, 2nd edition, Canghai congkan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1956; rpt., Taipei: Dongda, 1990), p. 617, for Zou Ji's dates.

27. See Roger T. Ames, *The Art of Rulership: A Study of Ancient Chinese Political Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983; rpt., Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 242, note 40 f., for classical sources of these two anecdotes.

28. "Zhushu" 主術; text in Liu Wendian 劉文典, *Huainan Honglie jijie* 淮南鴻烈集解, ed. Feng Yi 馮逸 and Qiao Hua 喬華, Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1989), 9, p. 275. Compare the translation in Ames, *The Art of Rulership*, pp. 172 f.

29. Cf. Goldin, "Insidious Syncretism."

30. *Mencius* 6A.15; text in Jiao Xun 焦循 (1763–1820), *Mengzi zhengyi* 孟子正義, ed. Shen Wenzhuo 沈文倬, Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1987), 23, p. 792. Cf. the translation in D.C. Lau, *Mencius* (New York: Penguin, 1970), p. 168.

31. Thus Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, p. 103.

32. On Xunzi's concept of 'mind,' see, e.g., Paul Rakita Goldin, *Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi* (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1999), pp. 21 ff.; Uchiyama Toshihiko 内山俊彦, *Chūgoku kotai shisōshi* 中國古代思想史 *ni okeru shizen ninshiki* 自然認識, Tōyōgaku sōsho (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1987), pp. 83 ff.; Lee H. Yearley, "Hsün Tzu on the Mind: His Attempted Synthesis of Confucianism and Taoism," *Journal of Asian Studies* 39:3 (1980), pp. 465–80; and Tang Chün-yi 唐君毅, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: Yuanxing pian* 中國哲學原論: 原性篇 (Hong Kong: Xinya, 1968), pp. 57 f.

33. "Jiebi" 解蔽, *Xunzi jijie* 15.21, p. 397. Cf. the translation in Knoblock, 3, p. 105.

34. Xunzi's idea that moral action represents a rational choice sheds further light on his implicit acceptance of cognitive faculties and propositional attitudes. According to Xunzi, we are free to follow the rituals or not, but one of Xunzi's most basic arguments is that following the rituals is prudent. This argument presupposes an element of rationality that seems incompatible with Fingarette's reconstruction of the Confucian concept of 'mind.' For more on this issue in Xunzi, see e.g., Goldin, *Rituals of the Way*, pp. 17 ff. and 68 ff.

35. One prime candidate is the "Nei ye" 內業, which postulates famously that the "mind" must have another "mind" within it. See the text in Dai Wang 戴望 (1783–1863), *Guanzi jiaozheng* 管子校正, Zhongguo sixiang mingzhu (Taipei: Shijie, 1990), 16.49, p. 270. These two minds can be interpreted as the material mind (i.e., the heart), which is of the same order as the other body organs, and the immaterial mind, which is unlike any part of the body.

36. Following the commentary of Lu Wenchao 盧文弨 (1717–1796). *Li* 厲 is often explained as a "temple," but Lu argues that the meaning "ghost" is probably intended.

37. Following the commentary of Sun Yirang 孫詒讓 (1848–1908).

38. Once again, the order of the seasons is skewed in the Chinese: 春秋冬夏.

39. This appears in the "Minggui xia" 明鬼下 chapter of the *Mozi*; text in Wu Yujiang 吳毓江, *Mozi jiaozhu* 墨子校注, ed. Sun Qizhi 孫啓治, Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1993), 8.31, p. 338. Cf. the translation in Yi-pao Mei, *The Ethical and Political Works of Motse*, Probsthain's Oriental Series 19 (London, 1929), pp. 163 f., where the term *zhuzi* 祩子 is miswritten as 株子. The story is also retold, with further reflections, in the "Siyi" 祀義 chapter of the *Lunheng* 論衡; text in Huang Hui 黃暉, *Lunheng jiaoshi (fu Liu Pansui jijie)* 論衡校釋 (附劉盼遂集解), Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990), 25.76, pp. 1051 ff., where the unfortunate priest's name is given as "Yegu" 夜姑. The name "Guangu" 觀辜, incidentally, may be allegorical: "Faulty Observance"; see Paul Rakita Goldin, "Personal Names in Early China—A Research Note," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 120:1 (2000). Cf. also Henri Maspero, *China in Antiquity*, tr. Frank A. Kierman Jr. ([Amherst]: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), pp. 116 f.

40. For more on the idea of souls and the afterlife in ancient China, see e.g., Yü Ying-shih, "O Soul Come Back! A Study of the Changing Conceptions of the Soul and Afterlife in Pre-Buddhist China," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 47:2 (1987), pp. 363–95; Yü Ying-shih, "New Evidence on the Early Chinese Conception of Afterlife," *Journal of Asian Studies* 41:1 (1981), pp. 81–85; and Michael Loewe, *Chinese Ideas of Life and Death: Faith, Myth and Reason in the Han Period (202 BC–AD 220)* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 25–37.

41. See, e.g., Poo, *In Search of Personal Welfare*, pp. 53 ff.; Poo, "The Completion of an Ideal World: The Human Ghost in Early-Medieval China," *Asia Major* 10:1–2 (1997), pp. 71–73; and Alvin P. Cohen, "Avenging Ghosts and Moral Judgement in Ancient China: Three Examples from the *Shih-chi*," in *Legend, Lore, and Religions in China: Essays in Honor of Wolfram Eberhard on His Seventieth Birthday*, ed. Sarah Allan and Alvin P. Cohen (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1979), pp. 97–108.

42. See, e.g., Richard Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul*, revised edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

43. Consider, e.g., Hansen, *Daoist Theory*, p. 52: "Dream arguments and sense skepticism play major roles in Western thought; they are at best minor refrains in Chinese thought." But the dream problem, with its associated

problem of sense skepticism, far from representing a "minor refrain," is a central theme in the philosophy of the *Zhuangzi*.

44. "Qiwulun" 齊物論, ZZJS 112; HY 7/2/94–96. Cf. the translations in Mair, *Wandering on the Way*, p. 24; and Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 190.

45. "Qiwulun," ZZJS 104; HY 6/2/81–83. Cf. the translations in Mair, *Wandering on the Way*, pp. 22 f.; and Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 189.

46. Cf. also the statement attributed farcically to Confucius in "Dazongshi," ZZJS 275; HY 18/6/81: "You dream that you are a bird and soar up to the sky; you dream that you are a fish and dive into a pool. But I do not know whether the present speaker is awake or dreaming." On dreams in the *Zhuangzi* in general, see, e.g., Robert E. Allinson, *Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 78–110.

47. Gareth B. Matthews, *Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 54 et passim.

48. René Descartes, *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1964–76), 7, p. 19; tr. John Cottingham, et al., *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2, p. 13. (The passage appears in the *First Meditation*.)

49. Cf. e.g., G. E. M. Anscombe, "The First Person," in *Mind and Language*, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), pp. 45–65.

50. Matthews, *Thought's Ego*, p. 4, following Hector-Neri Castañeda's distinction between *he* and *he**.

51. See esp. Kuang-ming Wu, *The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chapters of the* Chuang Tzu (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 416, note 28: "*Wo* is an identifiable self, which others can identify as a subject as well as an object. *Wu* is an identifying agent, but itself not identifiable as such." Kuang-ming Wu's own interpretation of the dream sequences in the *Zhuangzi* differs from the above, and he does not compare them to the similar passages in Descartes. Wu's more recent book, *On Chinese Body Thinking: A Cultural Hermeneutic*, Philosophy of History and Culture 12 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), was not available to me at the time of this writing.

Note that Kuang-ming Wu's understanding of *wu* and *wo* is controversial; see e.g., Paul Kjellberg's review in *Philosophy East and West* 43:1 (1993), p. 113, as well as Jochim, "Just say No," pp. 55 f., for recent criticism. For *wu* and *wo* generally, see Ann Heirman and Bart Dessein, "*ngo 吾 and *nga 我," *Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques* 52:3 (1998), pp. 695–761; R. H. Gassman, "Eine kontextorientierte Interpretation der Pronomina *wu* und *wo* im *Meng-tzu*," *Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques* 37:2 (1984), pp. 129–53; A. C. Graham, "The Archaic Chinese Pronouns," *Asia Major* 15:1 (1969), pp. 17–61; Jin Shouzhuo 金守拙 (i.e., George A. Kennedy), "Zai lun wu wo" 再論吾我, *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology* 28 (1956), pp. 273–81, reprinted in *Selected Works of George A. Kennedy*, ed. Tien-yi Li (New Haven: Far Eastern Publications, 1964), pp. 434–42; and Bernhard Karlgren, "Le proto-chinois, langue flexionelle," *Journal Asiatique* 11 (1920), pp. 205–32.

52. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 46.

53. Descartes proposes various solutions to the dream problem (indeed, he proposes at least two distinct kinds of dream problems). See e.g., Matthews, *Thought's Ego*, pp. 55 ff.; and Bernard Williams, *Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry* (New York: Penguin, 1978), pp. 51 ff. and 309–13.

54. Cf. e.g., Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?" in *Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the* Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 200; and Mark Berkson, "Language: The Guest of Reality—Zhuangzi and Derrida on Language, Reality, and Skillfulness," in Kjellberg and Ivanhoe, p. 109. This notion of the "therapy" of skepticism derives from the Hellenistic Skeptics. See e.g., Paul Kjellberg, "Skepticism, Truth, and the Good Life: A Comparison of Zhuangzi and Sextus Empiricus," *Philosophy East and West* 44:1 (1994), pp. 111–33, revised as "Sextus Empiricus, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi on 'Why Be Skeptical?'" in Kjellberg and Ivanhoe, pp. 1–25; and Martha C. Nussbaum, "Skeptic Purgatives: Therapeutic Arguments in Ancient Skepticism," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29 (1991), pp. 1–33, revised in Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Martin Classical Lectures: New Series, 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 280–315.